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DOES PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY JUSTIFY 
JUDICIAL ACTMSM AFfER ALL? 
THOMAS W. MERRILL* 
Some legal scholars have argued that public choice theory 
justifies certain kinds of judicial activism.! Others have said it 
does not. 2 Given the present state of the debate, it would appear 
that those finding no necessary support for judicial activism have 
the stronger argument. I will suggest, however, that if we tweak 
the analysis a little further, it may turn out that public choice 
theory provides limited support for judicial activism after all. 
From an economic perspective-which is to say, the public 
choice perspective-it may be useful to think of judicial activism 
as part of a larger market in which a product called "law change" 
is bought and sold.3 This market has many potential buyers, in 
the form of the interest groups to which the previous panelists 
have already referred. Virtually every group has some change in 
law it would like to see adopted, whether it be producer groups 
that would like to see new limitations on entry by potential 
competitors, or environmental groups that would like to see new 
limitations on the development of natural resources. 
On the seller side, we can simplifY the analysis by assuming 
that there are only two firms in the market for law change-the 
legislature and the courts. We can then reformulate the inquiry 
as follows: what sorts of factors will determine the demand for 
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Thanks to Ian Ayres 
and Eric Rasmusen for their suggestions. 
1. See, f.g., RICHARD A. EpSTEI:-J, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY A:-JD THE POWER OF 
E'lI:-JE:-;T DO\1AI~ (1985) (drawing in part on public choice ideas to suppOrt wide-
ranging judicial acti\~sm under the Takings Clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional 
Dnegulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 Tl'L. L. REv. 849 (1980) (using interest 
group analysis to justifY more intrusive judicial review of legislation for rationality). 
2. See NEIL K. KO\1ESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIO~S IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory justify 
More Intrusive judicial Review?, 10 1 YALE LJ. 31 (1991). 
3. For present purposes, I will define judicial activism broadly to include any change 
in the law by courts, whether produced by the overruling of precedent or by some kind 
of novel interpretation of the law that has not been enunciated before. 
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and supply of law changes from the courts-that is, the demand 
for and supply of judicial activism-as opposed to the demand 
for and supply of law changes from the legislature? 
The demand side of the equation has been pretty thoroughly 
analyzed by public choice scholars. Building on Mancur Olson's 
pioneering account,4 we can say that a group's demand for law 
change is a function of its ability to organize for collective 
action. That ability, in turn, is a function of such variables as the 
per capita stakes of the individuals who make up the group, and 
whether the group has a preexisting associational structure.s 
The following example can be used to illustrate Olson's 
analysis of group demand. The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
currently maintains a system of annually-adjusted quotas on the 
importation of sugar cane. Consumers as a group would benefit 
from raising the quotas: more imported sugar cane would 
increase the supply of refined sugar, which would in turn slightly 
lower the price of Frosted Flakes and Cokes. American farmers 
who grow sugar beets and sugar cane, however, would lose 
revenues if the quotas were raised: more imported sugar cane 
would lower prices for domestic producers. 
Olson's theory predicts that consumers will transmit a very 
weak demand for raising the quotas. Consumers are an 
extremely large group, and the savings to any individual 
consumer from a liberalization in the quotas would amount to 
only a few dollars a year.6 This will make it very hard for 
consumers to get organized and raise resources for collective 
action. No consumer has a strong incentive to pay much 
attention to the issue, and consequently free riding will be 
rampant if any collective action is attempted. Moreover, there is 
no preexisting associational structure of consumers devoted to 
this particular issue. 
Domestic sugar beet and sugar cane farmers, in contrast, are a 
much smaller group, with much higher per capita stakes. For 
them, the current system of quotas translates into thousands of 
dollars a year in additional revenues. Moreover, these farmers 
4. MA]\JCCR OLS01\:, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcnON (1965). 
5. See generally id. at 22-36. 
6. The total amount of money involved is substantial. The aggregate cost to consumers 
has been calculated to be over $500 million per year. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE 
THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 195-96 (5th ed. 1992). Divided over all consumers in the 
United States, however, this works out to only about two dollars per consumer. 
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are geographically concentrated in only a few states. This makes 
it easier for them to organize and raise money for collective 
action devoted to maintaining the quotas. Given their high 
stakes and geographic concentration, farmers will be more likely 
to pay attention to the issue, which will discourage free riders. 
And the farmers have a preexisting associational structure, in 
the form of farmers' organizations and marketing cooperatives 
set up and supported by the government. 
Legal scholars who have assimilated Olson's analysis have 
occasionally concluded that it justifies greater judicial activism. 
Mter all, if well-organized groups are over-represented in the 
legislative process, and poorly-organized groups are under-
represented in that process, then perhaps social welfare would 
be advanced by having courts decide these kinds of issues. 
More recently, however, other public choice-influenced 
scholars have successfully challenged this conclusion. 7 One is 
Einer Elhauge of Harvard Law School, who wrote a terrific 
article a few years ago pointing out, among other things, that the 
groups that are over-represented or under-represented in the 
legislative or administrative process are likely also to be over-
represented or under-represented, as the case may be, in the 
judicial process.H Another is Neil Komesar of Wisconsin Law 
School, who recently wrote a book that takes the point one step 
further. Komesar argues that the groups that are over-
represented or under-represented in the political process will 
also be over-represented or under-represented, as the case may 
be, in the courts and in the economic marketplace.9 
As Elhauge and Komesar have demonstrated, it is not a valid 
argument to point to some kind of failure in the political 
process-like interest-group capture-and say that this means 
we should have judicial activism. Such a shift may just replace 
capture of the legislature ""ith capture of the judiciary. To 
return to my sugar cane quota example, it will not do to suggest 
that consumers would be better off having the Agriculture 
Department's quotas challenged in court-perhaps by arguing 
that they violate the Administrative Procedure Act or the 
Constitution. For the same reasons that consumers will be able 
7. See supra note 2. 
8. See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 67-8. 
9. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 98-150. 
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to transmit only a weak demand to the legislature for change, 
they will be unlikely to mount any credible action in court. In 
fact, as far as I am aware there have been no judicial challenges 
to the sugar quotas brought on behalf of consumers. 
But so far we have looked only at the demand side of the 
equation. Perhaps when we turn to the supply side we can 
discover some basis for differentiation between the legislature 
and the courts as a source for law change. Here, I would suggest 
two factors that are potentially significant. 10 
The first I will call the minimum bid limitation for procuring a 
law change. The idea here is that neither the legislature nor the 
courts will supply a change in law unless an interest group is 
willing to pay at least a certain threshold price. This is easiest to 
see with respect to the courts, so I will explain the idea in that 
context first. 
As should be obvious, one cannot produce a change in law 
from the courts simply by writing a letter to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and saying "please change the law." Instead, you have 
to file a lawsuit and frame the facts and the legal arguments in 
such a way as to demonstrate the plausibility of a judgment that 
embodies the desired legal change. Then, of course, you have to 
have the resources and the skill to get the issue passed on by one 
or more appeals courts, and perhaps ultimately by the Supreme 
Court itself. All of this takes a significant amount of resources-
someone has to pay the lawyers. It also requires organizational 
skills, such as picking the right lawyers and the right cases, 
coordinating the lawyers, and so forth. 
How much does it take in order to mount a credible campaign 
to get the courts to change the law? If the project entails both 
trial court and appellate proceedings, I would guess that 
something around $250,000 in resources (or the equivalent in 
volunteer lawyering time) would be the minimum investment 
necessary to be a serious player in the market for judicial 
activism. I I In other words, the judicial supply curve does not 
10. The following draws upon Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 
22JL. & Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming 1997). 
11. Given these substantial threshold costs, the most common form of judicial 
"lobbying" by interest groups takes the form of filing amicus briefs in an effort to 
influence appellate courts in their resolution of cases filed by someone else. See, e.g., 
Robert C. Bradley & Paul Gardner, Underdogs, Upperdogs and the Use of the Amicus Brief 
Trends and Explanations, 10 JUST. SVS. J. 78 (1985). 
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peek its head out from the vertical axis until it starts to see bids 
of at least $250,000 (see Figure 1 below). 
The same point can be made with respect to the legislature, 
although here it is more uncertain exactly what the minimum 
bid might be. Every once in a blue moon someone writes an 
editorial advocating a new law, key members of the legislature 
read the letter and are persuaded by it, and a statute more or 
less spontaneously results. But 99.9 percent of the time it does 
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If a group wants to have a law change seriously considered by 
the legislature, it will have to mount a sustained and well-
conceived campaign in pursuit of this end. The group will have 
to motivate key legislators to embrace its proposal, perhaps by 
showing them that the group has the ability to influence how a 
significant number of votes will be cast in the next election, or 
that the group can direct a large amount of campaign 
contributions to the legislators, or that the group has significant 
influence over the attitude that the media will adopt toward the 
legislators in the near future. In other words, in order to be 
taken seriously by legislators, the group has to command 
significant resources or organizational backing, and has to make 
a credible threat to deploy those assets in support of its request. 
I have no idea what the exact magnitude might be of the 
minimum bid for invoking the legislative supply curve. It would 
depend on whether one is talking about the U.S. Congress, or a 
state legislature, or a city council. 12 It would also depend on 
whether the media is independently interested in the idea, and 
so forth. But my guess would be that, on average, the magnitude 
of the minimum bid, at least in the U.S. Congress, is much 
higher than in court. Just to pick a number, let us say $2 million. 
This means that the supply curve for law change from the 
legislature does not peek its head out from the vertical axis until 
we have passed a significantly higher threshold than is the case 
for law change from the courts. 13 
The concept of threshold costs, together with the reasonable 
hypothesis that threshold costs are higher for legislative action 
than for judicial action, has important implications for 
determining the supply of law changes from legislatures and 
courts. In effect, it establishes a kind of triage among groups. 
12. As Madison recognized, the larger and more complex the governmental body, the 
higher the cost of factional influence. See THE FEDERALIST No.1 0 Oames Madison). 
13. It may be technically inaccurate to speak of "threshold costs" for legislative action. 
If the legislature had no one bidding for its services, it would sell legislation for very little, 
since opportunity costs would be zero. V\'hat I have called legislative threshold costs are 
largely a function of the high level of demand for legislative services-for example, the 
high opportunity cost~ to the legislature of attending to anyone issue. From the 
perspective of a group seeking law changes, however, the source of the high costs of 
legislative action makes no difference. Thus, for ease of exposition I have used the term 
"threshold costs" to refer to the minimum bid necessary to elicit a response from either 
the courts or the legislature, even if in the case of the legislature the minimum bid is 
caused by demand from competing groups. 
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Those able to transmit only a feeble demand-represented by 
the downward-sloping demand curve D) in Figure I-v·till elicit 
no response from either the legislature or the courts. They are 
nonplayers in terms of procuring law change. Most consumer 
groups, taxpayer groups, members of future generations, and 
the like will be so disorganized that they cannot make the 
minimum bid necessary to secure a response from either the 
courts or the legislature. Other groups, on the other hand-
represented by the downward-sloping demand curve D~-are so 
powerful and well-endowed that they will be credible players in 
both the legislative and the judicial markets for legal change. 
These groups have the luxury of being able to choose which 
segment of the market for legal change in which to operate. 
Perhaps the most interesting groups are those in the middle-
represented by the downward-sloping demand curve D2• These 
groups are sufficiently well-organized and have enough 
resources to make a pitch for legal change in the courts, but 
they cannot overcome the high threshold costs needed to 
mount a credible campaign for change from the legislature. 
Included in this category may be many ideologically-oriented 
advocacy groups, such as civil rights groups, religious groups, 
environmental groups, and property rights advocates. These 
kinds of groups represent large numbers of people with fairly 
small per capita stakes, and hence they cannot afford very much 
in the way of campaigns for law change. For various reasons, 
however, they have been able to develop a skeletal organization 
and enough of a war chest occasionally to institute litigation (or 
at least file amicus briefs) seeking legal change. 
This analysis helps explain why most advocacy groups are 
committed proponents of judicial activism, even if the cause 
they are promoting is momentarily out of favor with the 
judiciary. If a proposed legal change is fought out in the courts, 
then advocacy groups will at least get a hearing and have some 
chance of prevailing. But if a legal change is determined by the 
legislature, they will not even get in the door. 
As a normative matter, the implications of the lower threshold 
costs for seeking law change through the courts are less clear. If 
you are a committed Burkean conservative who dislikes 
discontinuous legal change, then perhaps you would want to 
stamp out judicial activism. Judicial activism dramatically 
expands the universe of groups that can make an effective pitch 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
226 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 21 
for law change, and hence presumably increases the total 
amount of change that takes place. On the other hand, if you 
love legal change (for example, if you are a lawyer), then you 
should favor judicial activism, since it will churn up more 
change. 
\Vhether legal change is possible through judicial action may 
also have an impact on the type of legal change that occurs. 
Eliminating judicial activism would skew the market for legal 
change in favor of well-endowed and well-organized groups. If, 
as seems plausible to assume, the well-endowed and well-
organized groups are more likely to be economic groups (for 
instance, labor unions, producer groups, and professional 
groups), then eliminating judicial activism might tilt social 
policy away from ideological causes in favor of purely bread-and-
butter issues. Judicial activism therefore adds spice to the 
political system: issues like prayer in public schools and gay 
marriage become potential objects of legal change whereas 
otherwise they would be ignored. 
The second factor I would introduce might be called the 
maximum bid limitation. Again, the point is most easily explained 
with reference to the courts, so let us start there. \\That is the 
shape of the judicial supply curve as groups seeking law change 
make higher and higher expenditures? There is no doubt that, 
at least initially, the supply curve slopes upward to the right: the 
higher the expenditures, the greater is the supply of law change. 
The cheapest form of participation would probably be filing an 
amicus brief using volunteer or pro bono lawyers. As the group 
is able to invest more resources, it can move on to doing things 
like bringing test cases and using full- or part-time paid staff 
lawyers. With even greater levels of expenditure, the group can 
fund multiple test cases, hire a top-flight private law firm, 
procure the filing of amicus briefs by other supporting groups, 
and so forth. It is reasonable to assume that as the level of 
investment in litigation effort rises, the supply elicited from the 
courts, in terms of the probability of securing favorable rulings, 
rises too. 
After the litigation bills have piled up for a while, though, the 
law of diminishing returns starts to set in. Once one has hired 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore to file multiple lawsuits, and several 
boutique Washington firms to file amicus briefs, what else 
remains to be done? Hiring more and more lawyers will quickly 
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generate coordination problems and may interfere with the 
work product. In effect, there is a ceiling on how much one can 
spend effectively in seeking legal change through litigation. We 
can illustrate this in Figure 2 by indicating that after a point, the 
supply curve for courts is perfectly inelastic-no further increase 
in the level of expenditure by groups will yield a higher 
expected payout. Exactly where the supply curve becomes 
inelastic will depend on the nature of the issue; in the graph, I 
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In the legislative arena, it is much less clear that the supply 
curve becomes inelastic, at least in the range of expenditures 
that we are talking about. If the sugar farmers want to secure 
legislation tightening quotas-or want to block efforts to 
liberalize quotas-then the more they spend, the greater the 
expected value of the legislative output. The more PAC 
contributions, the more television ads about the need to protect 
the family farm, and so on, the greater the likelihood of 
favorable legislation. At some point, it is reasonable to assume 
that limits will be reached, given restrictions on campaign 
contributions, public revulsion against bribery, and the danger 
of advertising overkill. But this will probably occur at a far 
higher level of expenditure than will be the case with respect to 
a campaign for judicial activism. 
If the foregoing conjecture is correct, then we have a second 
way of distinguishing between the market for law change 
through courts and legislatures: the judicial supply curve 
becomes inelastic at much lower prices than the legislative 
supply curve. Suppose you have two groups, one seeking a 
change in the law and the other opposing it. Because of 
differences in per capita stakes and organizational structures, 
one group is able to transmit a demand for political action 
reflected by the downward-sloping demand curve D2 in Figure 2; 
the other group is able to transmit a demand reflected by 
demand curve D~. Notice that if the fight over the proposed 
change in law occurs in the legislature, the better-organized and 
better-funded group-D~-will almost certainly prevail. It will 
outspend and outlobby its rival D2, and thus it will presumably 
collect more votes for its preferred outcome. Indeed, D2 cannot 
even muster the resources necessary to get over the threshold 
for participation in the legislative forum. For this reason alone, 
as we have already seen, D2 will strongly prefer to have the issue 
resolved by the courts. 
In addition, however, D2 has more than just a fighting chance 
in the judicial arena. Because of the position of the demand 
curves and the inelasticity of the judicial supply curve at the 
points where it intersects the demand curves, D3 and D2 are 
exactly evenly matched in terms of expected outcomes in the 
judicial arena. Both groups operate in the portion of the judicial 
supply curve where additional expenditures on litigation elicit 
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no additional supply. In effect, the public choice dimensions of 
choosing between D3 and D2 have been neutralized. 
How plausible is it that the disparities in group demand for 
law change will be neutralized in the judicial forum? Obviously, 
this will not happen in every case. With respect to many 
controversies, groups that have low per capita stakes and poor or 
nonexistent organization will not be heard at all-they will not 
be able to surmount the threshold costs for participation in the 
judicial arena. Other controversies in the courts will pit a group 
that can reach the inelastic portion of the judicial supply curve 
against a group that can participate, but only at a lower level on 
the supply curve, in which case the first group will "outlitigate" 
the second. Still other controversies will be ones in which 
legislative action can trump a judicial outcome, with the result 
that the group that can prevail in the legislature ultimately 
triumphs even if the two groups are evenly matched in court. 14 
Nevertheless, it is plausible to believe that there is a range of 
controversies decided in the courts where the organizational 
capacities of the contending parties will have no effect on the 
outcome. \\-ben this happens, the dispute will be resolved, as the 
lawyers say, "on the merits," not on the basis of disparities in 
group organizational capabilities. '5 
We are now in a position to see why public choice theory may 
provide a justification for judicial activism after all. It is not, as 
the early public choice-influenced accounts suggest, because 
legislatures and agencies are always subject to differential 
interest group influence whereas courts are wholly immune 
from the logic of collective action. Rather, the case for judicial 
activism from a public choice perspective is more qualified. 
Public choice theory suggests that judicial policy making may be 
less susceptible to interest group distortions-but only within a 
narrow range of controversies where each of the contending 
positions is represented by a group with significant (but not 
necessarily equal) organization strength, and only when the 
14. This last qualification helps explain why groups that favor judicial activism also 
typically favor constitutionalizing large areas of law: constitutional decisions are more 
difficult for legislatures to trump than are nonconstitutional decisions. 
15. For some empirical support for this proposition as it applies to the Supreme 
Court, see Reginald S. Sheehan et aI., Ideology, Litigant Status, and the Differential Success of 
Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 464 (1992). 
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outcomes reached in these circumstances will not be trumped by 
a legislated solution. 
In offering these observations, I am not in any sense 
endorsing judicial activism. Interest group influence is only one 
variable that should be considered m evaluating the 
phenomenon of judicial activism. Other large and complicated 
issues involving judicial competence and constitutional and 
democratic legitimacy must also be evaluated. 
The argument does help, however, to explain why so many law 
professors are drawn to judicial activism. Public choice theory 
makes it easy to understand why law professors who support 
ideological advocacy groups favor judicial activism: the theory 
tells us that advocacy groups will, on the whole, have a better 
change of achieving success when social change comes from the 
courts than when it comes from the legislature. 
It is somewhat harder to explain why law professors 
influenced by public choice theory also sometimes favor judicial 
activism. As we have seen, however, public choice theory 
suggests that the dynamics of interest group influence may be 
neutralized in courts, at least under certain limited 
circumstances. This feature of judicial decision making will be 
appealing to those who are especially concerned by the 
distorting influence of interest groups in legislative and 
administrative proceedings. 
V\bat we have, then, is a kind of unholy alliance between 
advocacy-oriented professors and public choice-influenced 
professors, each supporting judicial activism, albeit for different 
reasons. Given this coalition of perspectives, it should come as 
no surprise that there are so few people left in the academy who 
have anything good to say about judicial restraint. 
